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Through Preimplantation Genetic Diagnosis, embryos created by IVF are selected for 
transfer to a woman based on particular characterisations , including the presence of 
genetic markers or a tissue match for a sibling. In this paper we examine the precise 
language used in the recent policy and regulatory documents of four jurisdictions (the 
United Kingdom, Australia, Canada and New Zealand) that in any way characterises 
the post-PGD embryo. We then explore the mutually constructed relationship between 
how that embryo is characterised and  the  purposes  for  which  PGD  is  applied,  as 
well as the types of uses to which the post-PGD embryo is ultimately relegated. As 
our analysis  indicates,  based  on  the  information  provided  through  PGD,  a  number 
of possible categorisations of the post-PGD embryo emerge depending both on the 





New technical possibilities, clinical considerations and research 
purposes are influencing both how we look at the embryo and what 
we look for.2 By convention, the term 'embryo' refers to the product 
of fertilisation of a human oocyte by a human sperm usually up to 
the first eight weeks of development. 3 Attempts have been made to 
characterise the human embryo from scientific,4 medical,5 ethical,6 
religious7 and social8 perspectives, and have frequently been influenced 
by views, interests and objectives of particular communities.9 As 
observed in Australia, the legislative definition of 'human embryo' is 
'a compromise between different views and resulted from the legal 
 
imperative to have a defined point against which legal judgements 
could be made' .10 Heightened interest in defining and characterising 
the human embryo has resulted from the creation and manipulation 
of embryos outside of women 's bodies  for  assisted  reproduction 11 
and, more recently, genetic testing. 12 Sub-definitions  of the word 
'embryo', such as 'pre-embryo' emerged in relation to  in  vitro 
fertilisation (IVF) and related genetic research .13 Research purposes, 
involving embryos created for the above clinical purposes, may also 
define  characteristics  of  the human  embryo. 14 
The characterisation of human embryos is influenced by and 
plays an important role in determining the possible uses and non-uses 
of an embryo by women undergoing IVF, clinicians and scientists. 15 
For example, there has been recent emphasis  on  selection  of  the 
'best' or 'most suitable'  embryo  for  implantation  in  order  to have 
the highest pregnancy rate without the risk of high order multiple 
pregnancy 16 including professional practice guidelines recommending 
single embryo transfer. 17 As assisted reproductive technology (ART) 
extends to genetic testing through preimplantation genetic diagnosis 
(PGD), new characterisations of the embryo emerge based on the 
genetic information available. 18 Through PGD, embryos created by 
IVF are selected for transfer to the woman 19 based on the presence 
of genetic markers .20 In addition, as new research opportunities arise, 
such as stem cell research, human embryos may be characterised in 
particular ways in order to promote research.21 
In IVF laboratories prior to the advent of embryo cryopreservation, 22 
 
microscopic determinations of  embryo 'health' based on morphologic 
criteria, including evidence of cell  division,  lack  of  fragmentation, 
and blastomere symmetry  and clarity, were  undertaken  in an attempt 
to determine the 'best' three (or more) embryos to transfer to the 
woman's uterus with the remaining embryos being discarded to avoid 
high-order multiple pregnancy. 23  For the past 15 years, embryos not 
transferred  in  the  IVF  'treatment  cycle'  have  been   cryopreserved 
for later transfer  to  the  woman  so  that  she  may  avoid  the  harms 
of menotropin drugs24 and oocyte retrieval surgeries25 inherent in 
additional IVF  cycles.26  Some IVF  clinicians  and  scientists  continue 
to use microscopic criteria to determine which are the 'healthiest- 
looking' embryos in order to transfer the  'best' embryos  while  'fresh' 
as they believe this practice achieves the highest pregnancy rate. 
However,  no  evidence  exists  that  an  embryo's  potential  to  become 
a child can be ruled out on morphologic characteristics as viewed 
through  a microscope,  indeed  there  is evidence  to the contrary.27 
The development and application of PGD provides another context 
in which determinations  of  the  'best'  or  'healthy'  embryo  are  made 
by providing access to a rapidly increasing number of gene markers .28 
These biomedical determinations may be used to prevent perceived 
'health'  problems  in  prospective  children,  or  to  select  characteristics 
of a potential child.29 PGD was developed in the late 1980s30 as a 
technology that would allow women/couples to be able to assess 
particular markers of inherited conditions in embryos created through 
IVF rather than in fetuses. By assessing IVF embryos for inherited 
 
conditions, and transferring to the women  only  the  embryos  that  do 
not have the genetic marker, women/couples who are considering 
preventing having a child who could develop a particular genetic 
condition, would not have to consider the physically and emotionally 
stressful alternatives of amniocentesis or chorionic villous sampling31 
followed by genetic abortion almost half way through the pregnancy 
(frequently  after fetal movement has been  felt).32 
Embryos undergo PGD when they have divided to  the  8-cell 
stage (day 3 post-IVF) or the following  day at the blastocyst  stage.33 
It is also possible to perform PGD on 'polar  bodies' 34  that  are 
extruded from the  eggs  following  the  metaphase  II  division.  When 
an 8-cell embryo undergoes biopsy for genetic assessment, all cells 
(blastomeres) are identical. One or two of these blastomeres can be 
removed from the embryo, usually without decreasing the embryo's 
ability to implant in the uterus.35 To remove a blastomere,  a tiny hole 
is made in the covering  of  the  embryo  (zona  pellucida).  This  hole 
was originally made with a dissolving solution,36 but now  is usually 
made through a laser  incision.37  The  blastomere  is  then  removed 
from  the  embryo   through   gentle   suction.38   Chromosome   number 
and structure are assessed through fluorescent  in situ  hybridisation. 39 
The DNA in the blastomeres is multiplied using polymerase chain 
reaction.40 When looking for  a  genetic  marker  embryos  from  which 
the blastomeres were removed may be transferred to the woman's 
uterus,  or cryopreserved  to be transferred  in  later cycles.41 
The focus of our exploration is on what we refer to as the 'post-
 
PGD embryo' - those embryos that have  undergone testing through 
PGD. We examine the precise language used in  the  recent policy and 
regulatory documents of four jurisdictions (the United Kingdom, 
Australia, Canada and New Zealand) that in any way characterises the 
post-PGD embryo. We then explore the mutually constructed 
relationship between how that  embryo  is  characterised and the 
purposes for which PGD is applied, as well as the types of uses to 
which the post-PGD embryo is ultimately relegated. As our analysis  
indicates,  based  on  the  information  provided  through  PGD, a 
number of possible categorisations of the post-PGD embryo emerge 
depending both on the outcome of PGD, and the initial  intention 
behind the procedure. 42 In the context of this examination we reveal 
how understandings of 'health' are being produced through the clinical 




Our research is based on the examination of documents from 
relevant government departments and  agencies,  research  bodies  and 
the policies and guidelines of various professional  bodies,  which 
relate to the practice of PGD in the United Kingdom,43 Australia,44 
Canada45   and New  Zealand.46 
The documents examined contemplate the regulation  and control 
of PGD as part of the governance of ART and the use of  in vitro 
human embryos. In the relevant legislation  of  the  jurisdictions 
 
examined here, PGD  is generally  referred  to only  in  limited terms,47 
or not  specifically  referred  to.48  We  contend  that  the  documents 
from regulatory and professional bodies examined here play  an 
important, but under-examined, role in informing and shaping the 
clinical practice and scientific applications of PGD in such legislative 
regimes. Our examination of these documents will analyse the precise 
language through which characterisations of the post-PGD embryo 
occur. Further, we will explore how the resulting uses or non-use of 
post-PGD embryos are intertwined with understandings of 'health' 
emerging  from the practice  of  PGD. 
 
III. CATEGORISATION & ISSUES 
 
Five overarching categories of characterisation of post-PGD 
embryos  emerge  from the  analysis  of  the documents  we  examined :49 
1) the affected embryo; 2) the unaffected embryo; 3) the sex-selected 
embryo; 4) the HLA tissue-typed embryo; and 5) the carrier embryo. 
Within each category issues related to assumptions behind the various 
categorisations of the post-PGD embryo, who makes decisions about 
categorisation, and what the implications of these processes  and 
decisions are for women, people living with disabilities, practitioners, 
scientists  and  society-at-large,  are  discussed. 
There are important differences in the way that each 
characterisation is constructed and determined in different jurisdictions 
as will be noted  in  our  discussion.  As  well,  these  characterisations 
 
are not mutually exclusive, rather the post-PGD embryo may fall into 
multiple categories at the same time, or shift from one to another 
depending  on its possible  use or non-use. 
 
1. The Unaffected Embryo 
 
An embryo that has been tested using PGD for genetic markers 
of  a  'disease'  or  'condition'  and  is free  of  these  markers  can  be 
characterised as an unaffected embryo. This theme emerged from the 
documents in terms used to describe such an embryo, as 'healthy' ,50 
'normal' ,51 'disease-free' ,52 'not known to have such an abnormality' ,53 
'suitable' ,54  as well as 'unaffected' .55 
The unaffected embryo is deemed to be  'suitable' for transfer 
or implantation based on its status as being  'disease-free' ,56 'without 
the genetic disorder' ,57 'free of the genetic disorder' ,58 'without a 
specific serious genetic disorder or  chromosomal  abnormality' ,59 
not having 'a copy of the faulty gene' ,60 or that they 'do not carry 
markers for the condition in question' ,61 are 'not known to have such 
an abnormality' ,62  or 'do not have a particular gene mutation' .63 
Only post-PGD 'embryos that  are  predicted  to  be  unaffected' 64 
are  implanted  in  the  woman,   providing   'an  opportunity   to  begin 
a pregnancy knowing that only unaffected embryos have been 
transferred' .65 As  recent  policies  in  New  Zealand,66  Australia,67  and 
the  UK68  proscribe   'the  number  of  embryos  transferred  is  kept  to 
a minimum' 69  including  the  possibility  of  a  single-embryo  transfer70 
 
to avoid the problems associated with multiple pregnancy and the 
'health' problems of the children born prematurely thereof.7 1  As with 
all IVF embryos, post-PGD  embryos  that  are  'no  longer  required' 72 
for the reproductive purposes for which they were created, may be 
described  as  'remaining' ,73    'supernumerary' ,74    'spare' ,75    'surplus' 76   or 
'excess' .77 
The way embryos are classified under one of these terms 
differs across jurisdictions as do the ways in which they can be used 
for either reproductive or research purposes beyond the reproductive 
needs of the woman or couple for whom they were created. 78 The 
unaffected embryos that are 'remaining',79 could be 'destroyed',80 
'stored for later use' ,81 'placed in storage' ,82 or 'used for research 
purposes' ,83 as well as donated to 'another individual' 84  for 
'reproductive purposes' .85 
It is in this context that unaffected embryos are characterised, in 
some documents, as 'healthy' 86 or 'normal' .87  While  'healthy'  is  not 
used as a general descriptor of the  unaffected  embryo,  it  has  been 
used to refer to 'unaffected' embryos in discussions about the dis- 
position of embryos that will not be used for reproductive purposes, 
either because there are  more  unaffected  embryos  than  are  needed 
for implantation, or because PGD is being used to select for a tis- sue-
match or against a carrier embryo. In these situations the ethical 
dilemma is framed in regards to the disposal or use of unaffected 
embryos deemed 'healthy' as a result of PGD. By implication the 
disposal or use of affected post-PGD embryos is not seen to pose the 
 
same  ethical  issues. 
We contend that a characterisation of 'health' based on the 
outcome of PGD  is problematic as only specific and limited genetic 
markers  are  identified,  and  therefore   'health'  is  understood   as  the 
absence of these markers and the conditions they are associated with 
in living persons. As the HGRP cautions,  'PGD is not a guarantee of 
a healthy  baby' .88 
 
PGD is not a guarantee that any resulting  pregnancy  and child will 
be perfect, or even healthy. The genetic testing can only find what is 
looked for so, whilst a fetus may be free of the Tay-Sachs disease it 
was screened for, it may be born with cystic fibrosis.89 
 
The HFEA has pointed out, through the use of PGD  ' ...the 
woman  makes  a  decision  about  suitability  based  on  information 
about the genetic status of the embryo' ,90 and it is clear that  genetics 
is only one of many factors in the overall health of a child. In  our 
view, the characterisation  of  the post-PGD  embryo based  on  'health' 
is further problematised by the implication of such  statements  that 
while limited in its scope, PGD could ultimately determine the health 
of an embryo. Moreover, no critical comment about what the word 





2. The Affected Embryo 
 
'The Affected Embryo' emerged as a characterisation of  post- 
PGD embryos which have been determined to have markers for a 
genetic condition and are described by terms such as:  'known to have 
a gene, chromosome or mitochondrion abnormality' ,92  'affected' 93  or 
those that have been found to have a genetic 'anomaly' ,94 'mutation' ,95 
an 'abnormality' ,96 'a genetic disease', 97 a 'serious genetic disorder' ,98 
'serious  genetic  defects',99   'genetic   abnormality   or   disease', 100 
'serious genetic abnormality or a disease', 101 or 'genetic conditions 
incompatible  with  life, or with  a life of  quality' .102 
These post-PGD embryos are generally also characterised as 
'unsuitable for implantation' ,103 'not suitable for implantation' ,104 
'unsuitable for transfer', 105 'not suitable for reproductive use', 106 
'unfit', 107 'unfit for transfer', 108 and 'not fit for implantation'. 109 
Generally post-PGD embryos characterised in these  ways  have 
been   'rejected', 110   'allowed  to  perish', 1 11   'stored', 112   'destroyed', 113 
or 'discarded' .114 The HFE Bill  requires  that  these  embryos  'must 
not be preferred'. 115 However, there is an emerging demand for such 
embryos as a supply of 'fresh' embryos for 'research, training and 
improvements in clinical practice' .116 In the jurisdictions we examined 
PGD is currently applied in cases of X-linked conditions, 'numerical 
chromosomal abnormalities', 117 specific gene mutations or 'single- 
gene defects'. 118 
a. The Seriously Affected Post-PGD Embryo 
 
 
The term 'serious' is invoked in a number of jurisdictions as a 
threshold from which to distinguish between current and acceptable 
applications of PGD and those characterised as 'trivial or [for] social 
reasons' .119 Despite widespread reliance on the term, there is no agreed 
upon definition of what 'serious' means in any of the jurisdictions we 
examinedP0 The HGC has stated that, '[i]t has proved impossible to 
define  what  'serious'  should  mean  in this context' .121 
The HFEA's Code of Practice specifies that PGD will be available 
'only where there is a significant risk of a serious genetic condition 
being present in the embryo', 122 while the HGC  recommends  that 
PGD should be limited to 'specific and serious conditions' .123 The 
HFE Bill introduced in the House of Lords in November 2007 would 
amend the HFE Act to limit 'embryo testing' for 'gene chromosome 
or mitochondrial abnormality'  to cases where 'there is a significant 
risk that a person with the abnormality will have or develop a serious 
physical or mental disability, a serious illness or any other medical 
condition' .124 Or in  the  case of  identifying  the  sex  of  an  embryo, 
to 'serious' cases of 'gender-related physical or mental disability', 
'illness', or  'medical  condition' .125  In  their  2005  report  on  the use 
of PGD for 'lower penetrance susceptibility conditions', the HFEA 
suggested, '[h]ow serious a condition is depends on how having the 
condition affects, threatens  or  limits  the  life  of  the  individual'. 1 26 
In their view, a condition that will not 'cause someone to suffer or 
detrimentally affect their life' would be 'unlikely to be regarded as 
 
serious', whereas a condition that requires 'regular invasive treatment, 
or was life-limiting or life threatening' would be. 127 Following this 
report the HFEA announced a policy approving the use of PGD for 
BRCA 1 and 2, genes linked to breast cancer, and HNPCC genes 
linked with colorectal cancer, 128 arguably opening PGD wider than 
their previous practice of limiting the application to high penetrance 129 
and early onset conditions. 130 
The HFEA does not  provide  a definition  of  'serious',  leaving  it 
to 'discussion between the people seeking treatment and the clinical 
team' 131  to   determine.   The   Code   of   Practice   outlines   factors   to 
be considered in determining when PGD is appropriate, including 
consideration of the perspective of the woman, or couple, and  the 
family situation, available support, as well as  the  nature  of  the 
specific condition in question. 132 Interestingly the original Draft Bill 
would have amended the HFE  Act  to  require  the  consideration  of 
five factors in determining whether embryo testing is 'necessary or 
desirable', including the extent of impairment, the age  of  potential 
onset, rate of degeneration, the proportion of those with the 
'abnormality'  who  are   'affected',  and  the  reliability   of  the  test, 133 
but excluding the perspectives of the woman and her partner or the 
family circumstances. 134 However, this provision was not included  in 
the HFE Bill under  consideration  by  the House of Lords in 2007. 
In Health Canada's consultation document on the regulation of 
PGD the use  of PGD for 'medical/health reasons' is distinguished 
from its use for 'non-health related traits such as hair or eye 
 
colour'. 135 Health  Canada cites the 'serious condition' standard as a 
limitation on the use of PGD around which there is some agreement, 
but acknowledges that it would be 'difficult to define' and that 'there 
are many complex factors that need to be accounted for in this 
definition'. 1 36 
In New Zealand's PGD guidelines,  one  of  the  conditions  for 
the use of PGD in the case of 'familial  single  gene  disorders', 
'familial  sex-linked  disorders'  and  'familial  chromosomal  disorders' 
is  'evidence  that  the  future  individual  may  be  seriously  impaired  as 
a result of the disorder'. 137 The determination of seriousness is not 
defined, but subsection  six  of  the  guidelines  provides  that  '[i]t  is 
the responsibility of PGD providers, in collaboration with a clinical 
geneticist, to determine whether a disorder  is likely  to be  serious in 
the offspring' .138 In this scenario the woman and her partner or family 
are absent from the determination of 'seriousness'. The New Zealand 
guidelines initially included the wording 'high risk of a serious 
abnormality' rather than 'evidence that the future individual may be 
seriously impaired' which appears in the final approved guidelines. 139 
The HGRP report argues that this shift opens up the range of disorders 
that might be considered to be included by providers, particularly 
disorders of late onset in which there is only a risk that the condition 
will present  at some point  in the future. 140 
The 'seriousness' standard  can  be  critiqued  from  a  number 
of perspectives . In the case of some  conditions,  '[a]lthough  PGD 
can confirm the presence  of  a genetic  anomaly,  it cannot  predict 
 
the extent to which the in vitro embryo, if transferred  into  the 
womb and born alive, would be affected  as  a  child  or  adult'.141 
This becomes particularly  problematic in the use of PGD for 'later 
onset' disorders such as Alzheimer's or 'low penetrant' conditions. 142 
Further, understandings of  what constitutes  'suffering',  what  might 
be considered 'detrimental effects', and when a condition is 'life 
limiting' or 'threatening' are subjective and depend on a number of 
factors in relation to both the individuals and family involved, as 
well as the particular condition in question. 143 As the HFEA itself 
suggests 'these factors may be difficult to predict before the affected 
person is born'. 144 
Evidence shows that 'people with genetic disorders, their families 
and professionals have different views  about  which  conditions  give 
rise  to  a  poor  quality  of  life.  In  general,  those  who  have  a  direct 
experience of living with a genetic disorder are likely to rate the 
quality of their lives more highly than would medically qualified 
professionals'. 145 As discussed below, the approach of the HFEA and 
Western Australia to consider the perceptions of people seeking IVF 
and PGD in determining 'seriousness' highlights the subjectivity of 
such a determination . While the UK legislative review dismissed the 
critics use of the word eugenics 'as an emotive term of abuse to 
obscure rational debate', 146 concerns  about who is defining what a 
'serious' condition is, and on what basis, have not adequately been 
addressed by policy or professional guidelines for PGD, particularly 
in light of the shifting nature of 'seriousness'. Rather than confronting 
 
the complexity of such determinations and their consequences, our 
analysis reveals that the legal and policy approaches tend to privilege 
'medical' or 'scientific' objective criteria, rather than more subjective 
considerations , implying that 'seriousness' can somehow be defined 
outside the context of people's lives and experiences. 
 
 
b. Licensing, Power, and Reproductive Autonomy in the 
Detection and Handling of the Affected Post-PGD Embryo 
 
In 2005 the HFEA  altered  the  approval  process  for  PGD 
licences such that once approval for a particular condition  in  one 
clinic has been granted, other clinics with 'proven  expertise  in 
performing embryo biopsies' will not have to go through the full 
licensing process to be approved for the same  condition,  using  the 
same technique .147 Thus while there is no formal 'list' of approved 
conditions, in practice particular applications of PGD will form an 
'accepted  list  of  conditions'. 148 
In Australia, while research on human embryos is governed 
nationally, the regulation of PGD falls under state jurisdiction. Many 
states rely on the  Commonwealth  regulatory  regime  governed  by 
the NHMRC's Ethical Guidelines, which restrict PGD to conditions 
that 'seriously harm' .1 49 However, some States do have specific 
legislation governing ART and PGD. In Western Australia  the 
RTC advises that the 'seriousness of a genetic disease should be 
 
considered in the broad context of the environmental and personal 
factors of the participants' .150 Licence applications for PGD should 
include the report of a 'clinical geneticist' in relation to a number of 
factors including: the family 's 'experience with, and attitude to' the 
condition; the 'level of impairment to body functions and structures 
that is usually associated' with a condition; the difficulties expected in 
'participating in activities such as learning and applying knowledge, 
communication, mobility, self care, employment, community, social 
and  civic life; the  'level  of  support' required  and  the  'capacity  of 
the family' to provide it; and the 'prospects for new and longer term 
treatments and interventions for the condition' .151 
In Victoria the ITA's PGD policy uses the criteria  outlined  in 
s.8(3) of the Infertility Treatment Act  1995 that a 'genetic abnormality 
or disease might be transmitted to a person born', but they do  not 
provide a definition of a genetic disease or abnormality. 152 The policy 
'entrusts' such  a  determination  to  'the  specialist  with  qualifications 
in human genetics ', explicitly putting the physician in the role of 
'gatekeeper'  in relation  to  PGD.153  The Authority's  3-tiered  approach 
to the regulation of PGD includes a schedule of 'Approved Genetic 
Testing'  published  in  June  2006  which  outlines  the  'routine'  uses 
of PGD that do not  require  notification  of  application. 154  The  ITA 
also includes uses of PGD that 'require approval on  a case by  case 
basis' such as sex-linked conditions where there is  'inconclusive 
evidence about the transmission of  that  condition'  including  Autism 
and Asperger's Syndrome.155 Conditions not  covered by the schedule 
 
would require  'prospective  notification'  to  the  authority. 156  Approval 
in these situations requires fulfilment of the s. 8(3) criteria of a 
'genetic abnormality or disease', based on  the  advice  of  a  'doctor 
with  specialist  qualifications  in  genetics' .157 
Access to PGD  in  Canada  'is  currently  controlled  by  the 
medical  profession',  158  however,   'there  are  no  Canadian  standards 
or professional guidelines relating to the use of PGD in Canada' .159 
Falling outside of formal regulation , decisions relating to PGD are 
privately  made by the women,  or couple, with her doctor. 160 
The HGRP points out that in New Zealand the professionals 
involved with PGD have been given 'a broad mandate to determine 
what constitutes a disorder that could cause serious impairment in a 
future child, and the likelihood of it happening' .161 They distinguish 
between the role of clinicians in the determination of the 'likelihood 
of a disorder manifesting in prospective offspring' (which they  see 
as 'generally unproblematic'), and their role in determining 'what 
constitutes a serious disorder'. 162 In their view, this determination 
involves  both  'objective  considerations'  such  as  the  age  at  which 
a disease would emerge or the potential of prevention and/or 
therapy, and 'subjective considerations'  such  as the  'experience  of 
the prospective parents in relation to the  condition '.163 The report 
considers the possibility that 'by leaving such decisions in the hands 
of treating clinicians, rather than in those seeking the procedure , PGD 
cannot be represented as providing greater autonomy and reproductive 
freedom' .164 
 
Respect for reproductive autonomy  is invoked  as  a justification 
for placing determinations of 'seriousness ' in the private realm. 165 
Leaving decisions about PGD to a 'discussion between the people 
seeking  treatment  and  the  clinical  team'  is  presented  as  a  way  to 
balance 'respecting the views of those seeking PGD whilst preventing 
the use of technology for purposes that are widely considered to be 
unacceptable' .166 While we support the primacy of women's role in 
determining what reproductive choices are best for herself and her 
family, we caution that respect for reproductive autonomy should not 
be invoked to allow policy  makers  and  clinicians  to  avoid  complex 
and difficult questions about the potential impact of reproductive and 
genetic technologies on understandings of 'health' and 'normalcy'. 
Questions about how the use of technologies like PGD  will  affect 
broad social norms about family and being human 167 or how ' ... 
reproductive choices are being made against a background  of 
inadequate social support for, and widespread discrimination against, 
disabled people and people with genetic disorders' 168 should not be 
sidestepped  or kept behind  the closed  doors  of  the clinic. 
 
 
c. Relationship of PGD and Traditional Prenatal Diagnosis 
 
Until the new Code of Practice was released in 2007 169 the 
HFEA maintained that the 'indications for the use of PGD should be 
consistent with (though not necessarily the same as) current practice 
 
in the use of prenatal diagnosis', 170 while the Royal College of 
Obstetricians and Gynaecologists, in their response to the review of 
the HFE Act, 171 stated that the conditions for which PND is allowed 
should be the 'minimum' for which PGD can be applied. Such a 
regulatory approach would have mirrored that in place for PND with 
a similar approach of 'general guidance' rather than 'a list of specific 
conditions' .172 While the current Code of Practice no longer considers 
the relationship between PGD and PND, it is nonetheless revealing 
to examine how it has been presented in the development of PGD 
policy. 
It is often argued  that  PGD  is  a  preferable  practice  to  PND 
for at  least two  reasons : it  is less  traumatic  for  the  woman  because 
of  the  avoidance  of  termination  of  a  pregnancy 173  and  it  facilitates 
a moral distinction that  is  made  between  'an  unimplanted  embryo 
and a fetus in  an established pregnancy', which serves to justify the 
application of  PGD  in  situations  where  termination  would  rarely 
be considered. 174 However, a number of concerns follow from this 
hierarchical ordering of the in  vitro  embryo  in  relation  to  the  fetus 
and of PGD versus PND. For example, what effect might the imputed 
moral distinction between the in vitro embryo and the in utero fetus 
have on attitudes to abortion and women's reproductive autonomy? 
Arguably, it could become less socially acceptable for women to seek 
abortions following PND in light of an ethical preference for the use 
of PGD - a practice  that is both  expensive  and invasive. 
An  additional  consequence  of  regarding  PGD  as more  ethically 
 
acceptable than PND entails a shift away from characterising the 
purpose of screening and  diagnosis  as  the  provision  of  information 
for  potential  parents  through   which  they  can  decide  to  terminate 
a pregnancy, or prepare for the birth of a child with a particular 
condition. 175 The HGC contends, in relation to PND, that '[c]urrent 
clinical best practice rejects the  notion  that  women  will  necessarily 
end a pregnancy after  the  identification  of  a  fetal  abnormality' .  In 
the case of PGD there  is no pretence that given a positive diagnosis 
the woman could or would choose to have a child with a genetic 
condition, in fact in some jurisdictions such as Victoria and New 
Zealand, this would be prohibited. 176  In Australia,  embryos identified 
as affected by PGD  are  now  defined  under  s.7(1)  of  the RIHE Act 
as 'unsuitable for implantation' by law as a result of the recent 
amendments in the Patterson Act.177 It is important to consider what 
effect this subtle shift towards a presumption of  selecting out genetic 
conditions may have on our attitudes to people living with them, and 
also towards parents who choose not  to  use  PGD  or PND  to  select 
out genetic conditions. 178 Already people with disabilities and their 
families experience high levels of discrimination and a lack of social 
support. 179 Will the expansion of PGD, in which de-selection of such 
conditions is presumed and normalised, exacerbate the exclusion and 





d. Disposition  of  the Affected  Post-PGD  Embryo to Research 
Purposes 
 
As illustrated above, the 'affected' post-PGD embryo is generally 
considered to be incompatible with reproduction. Characterised as 
'unsuitable' 180 or 'unfit', 181 the affected embryo is assumed to be 
'discarded', 182 'allowed to perish', 183 or undergo other steps that  will 
result in their 'disposal', 184 or 'destruction' .185 The 2005 legislative 
review in Australia found that due to the cryopreservation requirements 
for the donation of 'excess'  embryos,  'embryos  that  are  not  suitable 
for implantation for any reason, including embryos that are found  to 
have a genetic disease using preimplantation genetic diagnosis, are 
allowed to die and are not available for research' .186 Our analysis 
reveals that the characterisation and disposition of the post-PGD 
affected embryo are shifting, and we suggest  that  this  driven,  at 
least in part, by the demand for embryos for research and training 
purposes. 187 
Following the 2005 legislative  review,  debates  in  Australia 
suggest  that  designation  as  an  affected  embryo  may  signal  a  shift 
in an embryo's potential purpose and/or value. On the one hand, the 
value of the affected embryo for reproductive purposes is diminished, 
since it is assumed that the intention of undergoing the diagnostic 
procedure is to avoid transfer of an  embryo affected by the genetic 
condition for which it is being tested .188 However, on the other hand, 
the affected embryo becomes potentially valuable for research and 
 
training purposes. 189 Indeed, in a recent  consultation  on  embryo 
research in New Zealand, the ACART singled out post-PGD embryos 
as a specific source of  surplus embryos for research  purposes. 190 
ACART proposes the use of post-PGD embryos for research 
purposes since 'they may never be transferred to a woman's uterus' .191 
Likewise the question of whether the  post-PGD  affected  embryo 
should be considered to be available  for research  and training  based 
on the presumption that it would  otherwise be 'discarded" 92 was 
prominently discussed in the 2005 Australian  legislative  review  and 
has since been the subject of major amendments to the RIHE Act 
through the Patterson Act  which  came into force in 2007. A number 
of submissions made during the review pointed  to the lack of clarity 
in the RIHE Act regarding the status of post-PGD affected embryos 
deemed to be  'unsuitable for implantation' .193 It was argued by a 
number of parties 194 that post-PGD affected embryos should not be 
characterised as 'excess' embryos and thereby subject to the same 
consent and donation process outlined in the 'ART Guidelines' that 
applies to those embryos created by IVF, but no longer required for 
reproduction. 195  Avoiding  their  characterisation  as   'excess',   would 
free up post-PGD affected embryos to be used as a source of 'fresh' 
embryos  for research  and training  purposes. 196 
Researchers and professional bodies  who  made  submissions  to 
the Australian Legislative Review Committee  consistently  suggested 
that  'fresh  embryos'  were   'required', 197   would   be   'useful' 198    and 
that    'abnormally     fertilised'    and    'unsuitable'    embryos     'should 
 
be made available for research and training' .199 The  Review 
Committee recommended that  post-PGD  embryos  'diagnosed ...as 
being unsuitable for implantation should be permitted  to  be  used 
under licence for research, training and improvements in clinical 
practice' .200 The recommendation was  expressly  aimed  at  addressing 
the problems with availability of 'fresh'201 embryos due to the 14-day 
'cooling-off '202 period that applies to donations of 'excess' embryos 
resulting from IVF to research,203 effectively requiring that donated 
embryos be frozen and stored before they are available  for research. 
The Committee specifically relied on the assumption that affected 
embryos  would  'normally  be  discarded', 204  as  they   are  unsuitable 
for reproductive purposes, and therefore should not be subject to the 
"proper  consent"  procedures: 
It appeared to the Committee that the RIHE Act is not clear  on 
whether such embryos could ever be considered to be 'excess ART 
embryos' (because they are not suitable  for  reproductive  use  in  the 
first place), and therefore  whether  they  could  ever  lawfully  be  used 
for research purposes (even if they are first  frozen) ...In  the  view  of 
these ambiguities in the Act, as well  as the  potential  use  of  embryos 
that are not suitable for implantation in research, training, and quality 
assurance  activities,  the   Committee  considers  that  there  should  be 
clear and unambiguous provisions within the legislation and licensing 
arrangements for declaring embryos that are unsuitable for implantation 
as 'surplus embryos', and that such embryos should be permitted to be 
used  for research,  training,  and  improvements  in  clinical practice.205 
 
 
It is  significant that this debate emerged in Australia where the 
creation of human embryos for research purposes was prohibited under 
the Prohibition of Human Cloning Act 206 until the recent amendments 
lifting the ban on cloning by allowing for the creation of a human 
embryo clone but not the 'placing of a human embryo clone in the 
human  body  or the body  of  an  animal'.207 
As the case of Australia reveals, the demand for embryos for 
research, particularly fresh embryos, may put a strain on regulatory 
measures restricting access to embryos  created  through  IVF that  are 
not used for reproductive purposes . Recent developments  in  Canada 
and New Zealand reveal similar  debates  about  access  to  'fresh' 
embryos, and post-PGD embryos in particular. Interestingly a similar 
debate has not emerged in the United Kingdom  where the creation of 
in vitro embryos  for research  has  been  legal  under  licence  pursuant 
to s.3(1) of the Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act,208  although 
the 'question of what can or should be  done  with  those  considered 
spare or unsuitable for implantation' was acknowledged in the most 
recent legislative review in 2005 as a 'major  stumbling  block  for 
some  individuals  and  groups'.209 
In Canada, with the exception of the creation of a small number 
of in vitro embryos for improving or providing instructions in assisted 
human reproduction procedures, only embryos no longer required for 
reproduction, will become available for research purposes, through non-
commercial donation with written consent to their use.210 Until recently 
donation of fresh embryos to research was not generally offered to 
 
women undergoing  IVF,  and  although  not  technically illegal, had not 
been approved by the Canadian Institutes for Health Research (CIHR).211 
However, recent changes to the CIHR Guidelines for Human 
Pluripotent Stem Cell Research,212 which govern embryo donation to 
research under s.40(3.1) of the AHR Act, explicitly allow for fresh 
embryo donation, approving both embryonic  stem cell lines and other 
pluripotent  cell lines  from  human  embryos  where: 
1. The embryos used, whether fresh or frozen, were originally created 
for reproductive purposes and are no longer required for such 
purposes ; 
and 
2. There was free and  informed  consent  from  the persons  for whom 
the embryos were originally created  for  reproductive  purposes ...; 
and 
3. Neither the ova nor sperm from which  the  embryos  were created, 
nor the embryos themselves were obtained through commercial 
transactions   ...213 
 
We suggest that there has been a recent shift to allow for the use of 
'fresh' embryos in stem cell research, in response to the demands of 
stem cell researchers. 
While there has not yet been an  explicit  distinction  drawn 
between the use of affected  versus  unaffected  embryos  in  Canadian 
law or policy regarding embryo donation, the changes to the CIHR 
guidelines have inspired some debate about the need to distinguish 
 
between 'healthy' and 'unsuitable' embryos  for  the  purposes  of 
donation to research . Notably in a recent presentation to the Senate 
Standing  Committee  on  Social  Affairs ,   Science   and   Technology, 
Dr. Fran\:ois Baylis advocated for revisions to proposed consent 
regulations pursuant to the AHR Act to permit  embryo research  only 
on frozen embryos and 'fresh embryos 'unsuitable for transfer' (for 
morphological, biological, or genetic reasons)' .214 While the Standing 
Committee did not adopt Baylis's recommendations, they  did 
recommend a 'more in-depth review' of 'the research use of  fresh, 
viable,  embryos'  and  included  her  submissions  in their  report.215 
ACART's consultation document regarding embryo research in 
New Zealand reports that '[w]hereas formerly all the surplus embryos 
were frozen, they are now allowed to develop further and only the 
viable embryos are now frozen' .216 It is unclear whether this would 
exclude post-PGD affected embryos from being frozen, as 'non-viable' 
embryos are defined by ACART as those without 'the potential to 
develop into a foetus because of arrested growth, defects within the 
blastomeres, or poor morphology' and in which 'analysis of the genetic 
component ...reveals abnormalities in the chromosomes' .217 However, 
given that post-PGD affected embryos 'may never be transferred to 
a woman's uterus' 218 it is not clear that they would be frozen along 
with unaffected surplus embryos for future use. ACART's document 
suggests that the results of PGD will increasingly determine the types 
of use deemed appropriate for post-PGD embryos in New Zealand in 
light of their explicit consideration as a source for research embryos. 
 
According to the consultation document, embryos that would otherwise 
be considered  'viable', given their potential to develop into a foetus, 
might  be  excluded  from  consideration  for  reproductive  use  in  New 
Zealand  based  on  their  genetic  characteristics. 
While there are clearly important reasons to be concerned about 
the donation of fresh embryos to research in relation to the future 
reproductive interests of the women undergoing IVF treatment, 219 our 
analysis reveals that there are equally important concerns about how 
and by whom determinations of 'suitability' are made in the context 
of embryo donations to research . Without a public and transparent 
debate about how, and by whom, concepts like 'unsuitable' will be 
defined - one which accounts for the perspectives of people living 
with genetic conditions and their families - we must be careful not 
to uncritically adopt genetic technologies such as PGD as sources of 
objective determinations of health or normalcy and reproductive use. 
The use of post-PGD embryos as a source of 'fresh' embryos 
raises concern about the potential for the need for research embryos 
to influence the type of determinations made by those practicing PGD. 
Increased comfort with this production of embryos through IVF for 
non-reproductive purposes may help to justify the expansion of PGD's 
application and raises the possibility that standards regarding what is 
considered a 'suitable' or 'unaffected' embryo may become narrower 
in the interests of ensuring a supply of fresh embryos for research. 
In tum, this could further shift our understanding of what kinds of 
conditions are compatible, or incompatible, with reproduction and 
 
health. 
Despite ongoing debate  about  the  implications  of  using  PGD 
to  select  against  embryos   with   inherited   genetic   conditions,   and 
the lack  of  transparency  in  decision-making  about  the  conditions 
for which PGD should be available, the presumption in favour of 
selection against genetic conditions is found  throughout  the literature 
we  examined: 
 
...there are some situations in which it is  known  that  embryos  will 
never be used for reproductive purposes; for  example,  embryos 
identified by preimplantation genetic diagnosis (PGD) to be carrying 
genetic diseases, and embryos where other abnormalities are identified. 
These embryos  would  normally  be  discarded.220 
 
Distinctions are being made between embryos to be used for 
reproduction and affected embryos based on problematic assumptions 
about the use and purposes of reproductive technologies. The 
submissions of Professor Agnes Bankier of Genetic Health Services 
Victoria clearly demonstrate how clinicians and researchers presuppose 
that 'couples would not go through PGD u nless they wanted to avoid 
having a child with the genetic disease'.221 The assumption that 
'reproductive  use'  inherently  means  the  use  of  an  embryo  free  of  a 
particular genetic  condition  or abnormality  subtly  shifts the meaning 
of reproductive use, such  that  it  necessarily  excludes  the  conditions 
for which PGD is licensed and utilised. However, it is the process of 
 
PGD itself,  and  the  subsequent  characterisations  and  determinations 
of clinicians about the presence of particular genetic markers or 
abnormalities in the post-PGD embryo which produce this lack of 
suitability or fitness in the embryo; and, in doing so it redefines 
reproduction  to exclude  the  affected  embryo. 
 
 
e. Legislating Suitability: The Unsuitable Post-PGD Embryo in 
Law 
 
Australia's Patterson Act222  amends the RIHE Act to authorise 
modifications of 'proper consent' for licenses for the use of 'unsuitable' 
embryos. The Act now defines 'unsuitable for implantation, in relation 
to a human  embryo' in the following  way: 
 
(a) is diagnosed by preimplantation genetic  diagnosis  as unsuitable 
for implantation, in accordance  with  the  Ethical  Guidelines  on 
the Use of Assisted Reproductive Technology in Clinical Practice 
and Research  (2004),  issued by the CEO of the NHMRC;  or 
(b) is  determined  to  be  unsuitable  for  implantation   in  the  body 
of a woman, in accordance with objective criteria specified in 
guidelines issued by the CEO of the NHMRC under the National 
Health and Medical  Research  Council Act  1992 and  prescribed 
by  the regulations  for the purposes  of this paragraph. 223 
 
 
The amendment responds directly to the Lockhart REVIEW'S 
recommendations that the unsuitability of ART embryos be determined 
according to 'objective criteria', and through the use of PGD to detect 
'serious genetic defects' .224 The REVIEW contrasted the objective 
determinations of PGD to the subjectivity of determining 'when the 
embryo appears less healthy' ,225 and the amended RIHE Act  now 
legally sanctions PGD as one objective means of determining the 
suitable from  the  unsuitable,  based  on  genetic  information. 
Implicit in the Lockhart recommendations, and now  in  the 
amended  law,  is  an  understanding  of  'health'  as  the  absence  of 
the particular genetic mutations identified by PGD. This implicit 
assumption about  the  relationship  between  'health'  and  the  absence 
of particular genetic mutations allows the Review to  avoid  debates 
about  the  limitations  of  genetic   determinations   of   health,226   as 
well as concerns about the implications of  PGD  for  people  living 
with   disabilities.227   By   positioning   PGD   as   an   'objective'   means 
of  determining   'suitability'  the  Review   failed  to  acknowledge  the 
subjective factors involved in clinical decisions about when PGD 
should be applied, and  for  what  purposes.  The  Review  relied  on 
the fact that these embryos would 'never' 228 have been used for 
reproductive purposes to justify this kind of use.  We  suggest  that 
given the problematic  nature of determinations about 'seriousness', 
'health' or  'quality  of  life'  in  relation  to  genetic  conditions,  it  is 
the application of PGD itself which produces the inevitability that 
embryos with  particular  genetic  conditions  will  not  be  transferred 
 
to the woman, not the inherent or biomedical incompatibility of 
particular genetic mutations with reproduction. Under Australia's new 
law the practice of ART professionals in administering PGD becomes 
the source of an 'objective' 229 determination of suitability, and their 
determinations become the means through which 'fresh' embryos are 
made available for 'research, training and improvements in clinical 
practice'. 230 
Section   24  of   the  RIHE  Act,   which   sets  out   the   
licensing conditions  for the use of excess ART embryos,  now  
specifies that: 
 
(a) a licence may provide that that guidelines referred to in the 
definition of proper consent apply in a modified form in relation 
to the use, under the licence, of excess ART embryos that 
are unsuitable for implantation; and 
(b) if a licence so provides, the guidelines as modified by the licence 
have effect in relation to the giving of consent for such creation 
or use.231 
 
While  the  amendment   does  not  specifically   implement  the' 
removal of the cooling-off period for post-PGD affected embryos as 
recommended by Lockhart and accepted by the Senate Committee,232 
it includes the following note:  '[f]or example, the guidelines could 
apply to a particular licence in a modified form, to alter the cooling- 
off period required in relation to the use of excess ART embryos that 
 
are unsuitable for implantation' .233 
The Lockhart Review gave considerable weight to the arguments 
that undesirable constraints have been put on ART research and 
training under the current legislative scheme: 'It is clear that areas of 
ART research have been impeded  or stopped  altogether'  and that  '... 
the licensing requirements place a significant barrier on training and 
quality assurance activities, further limiting the progress and quality of 
developments in ART' .234 The Committee expressed 'concem' 235 about 
this 'apparently unintended consequence of impeding valuable research 
and clinical practice in ART clinics' 236 and  their  recommendations 
about the use of post-PGD affected embryos  are a direct response. 237 
In  their  statement  of  support for the Lockhart  recommendations,  the 
Senate Committee cited Australia's 'leading role in biotechnology' 238 
implying that any legislative changes should ensure this leadership 
continues. Attention to these kinds of concerns are also indicated by 
amendments to s.47(4) of the RIHE Act, which require that review of 
the Act will now 'take into account' a number of additional factors 
including 'an analysis of any research or clinical practice which has 
been prevented as a result of legislative restrictions' .239 
 
 
f. The Positively Affected Post-PGD Embryo 
 
Women may choose to undergo PGD in order to have a child 
with particular characteristics that others might view as a disability 
 
and thus not in the best interest of the future child's well-being. 240 
This is frequently termed 'positive selection'.241 The most often cited 
potential example is selection of a gene for deafness, based  on  a 
US case in which a deaf lesbian couple intentionally chose a deaf 
sperm donor with an extensive family history of deafness in order 
to produce a child who was also deaf.242 The couple maintained that 
they considered deafness to be a culture, not a disability, challenging 
those who would characterise the decision as harmful or not in the 
child's best interests,243 as well as supporting arguments against 
accepting concepts of 'health', 'disease' and  'normalcy'  without 
critical appraisal.244 
This reasoning complicates dichotomous categories assumed to 
be natural and mutually exclusive  such  as  'medical'  and  'social', 
and in the case of PGD, acceptable and unacceptable. 245 Disability 
rights perspectives contend that disability is a socially and politically 
constructed concept, not a  self-evident  medical  category.246  While 
the STC in the UK contends that '[w]e should use the current 
impracticality of screening for desirable social characteristics to 
engage in a rational debate on the subject' ,247 a disability rights 
perspective would suggest that current PGD practices of selecting- 
out genetic conditions is doing precisely this kind of screening.248 
The STC's report also refers to the example of selection in favour of 
fertile achondroplastic dwarfism,249 finding that support for such uses 
of PGD are justified by the need to respect reproductive autonomy 
and popular discomfort would not justify state intervention: 
 
 
We can imagine that many clinicians would baulk a the idea of 
selecting, for example, a deaf child  using  PGD  but  we  do  not  feel 
that the creation of a child with reduced life opportunities is sufficient 
grounds for regulatory intervention, else we might logically deny poor 
people  IVF.250 
However,  the  STC's  position  is  premised  on  a  characterisation 
of deafness and dwarfism offered by Dr Professor Tom Shakespeare 
in his submissions to the committee as 'minor or trivial conditions', 
where the child would suffer 'disadvantage' rather than 'discomfort' .251 
They maintain such decisions would be 'more challenging'  in  the 
case of 'obvious discomfort' ,252 but fail to explore this further and 
engage with critical perspectives on disability which point out that 
there is no clear line between what is trivial or serious.253 
In the UK and Canada, the legal status of this kind of genetic 
selection is not certain;254 however, other jurisdictions have  expressly 
prohibited  selection  for  'a  genetic  impairment  seen  in  a  parent' 255 
in the case of New Zealand, or 'in favour of genetic disease or 
abnormality' 256 in Victoria. Australia's NHMRC Ethical Guidelines 
restrict this use of  PGD  '[p]ending further community  discussions' .257 
If passed, the UK's HFE Bill will amend the HFE  Act  to  ban 
positive selection of an embryo 'known  to have a gene, chromosome 
or mitochondrion abnormality involving  a  significant  risk  that  a 
person with  the abnormality  will  have  or develop a serious physical 
or mental disability, a serious illness or any other serious medical 
 
condition' where there are embryos without the abnormality available 
for transfer.258  Interestingly  the  Bill  will  also  prohibit  selection  of 
an embryo or gamete donor with a specific condition, effectively 
outlawing positive selection through the use of ART even outside of 
the application of PGD.259 The explanatory notes of the original Draft 
Bill, from which the HFE  Bill was  developed,  specifically  reference 
the 'positive  selection  of  deaf  donors  in  order  deliberately  to  result 
in a deaf  child' as being prevented  by  the proposed  law.260 
As Canada's Brave New World report considers there may be 
significant human  rights  issues  raised  by  these  kinds  of  provisions 
in regards to both the individual liberty and equality aspects of 
reproductive choices.261 Such a  prohibition  is  also  inconsistent  with 
the fact that we would not stop  someone  with  a  genetic  condition 
from having children without ART procedures in order to prevent the 
condition from being inherited. Further, as the HGRP PGD report 
considers, the New Zealand prohibition 'may in fact limit some 
reproductive choices', using the example of a  couple  who  undergo 
PGD for one condition with a limited  number  of eggs, and find that 
all the embryos are 'affected with the disorder being screened for' .262 
They suggest that the Guidelines would preclude the couple from 
choosing an 'affected' embryo  'in  the  hope  that  the  expressivity  of 
the disorder  in the resulting  child  will be only mild' .263 
4. The Sex-Selected Embryo 
 
When PGD is used to test for sex-linked 'disorders', the 
 
determination as to suitability will be based on the sex of  the 
embryo,264 and only post-PGD embryos 'not of the affected sex' are 
transferred  to  the  woman. 265  However,  selecting  for  sex  where  there 
is no serious medical reason for doing so is prohibited in several 
jurisdictions. 266 
PGD can be used to identify the sex of an embryo.267 As noted in 
documents from all countries,268 in the case of sex-linked 'disorders', 
sex selection through PGD is used to avoid the implantation of 
embryos of the sex that is likely to exhibit a particular genetic 
condition in a child.269 While this type of sex selection, referred to 
as sex selection for medical purposes, 'has become widely accepted 
as a legitimate route' 270 many of the issues discussed above regarding 
selecting against particular genetic conditions271 or 'undesirable 
characteristics' 272 are also applicable to the sex-selected embryo. 
However, additional considerations arise when PGD is used to 
determine the sex of an embryo for 'social' 273 or 'non-medical' 274 
reasons, which include 'family balancing', 'rebuilding a family after 
the death of a child with another of the same sex', or 'to fulfil a 
general preference for children of one sex over another'.275 Indeed, 
sex-selection for 'social' reasons is one of the most contentious 
aspects of the debate surrounding PGD, as the 'simple genetic basis' 
of sex makes it currently available unlike other forms of 'social' 
selection and 'designer babies', which are commonly dismissed as 
'unrealistic'.276 
In  the  majority of jurisdictions examined, non-medical  sex 
 
selection  is  expressly  prohibited  in  either  legislation,  or  through 
professional guidelines  referring to  PGD.  New Zealand's PGD 
Guidelines expressly prohibit  the use of PGD for  'social reasons - 
including sex selection' .277  Canada's AHR Act makes it an offence to 
'identify' the sex of an embryo except to avoid a sex-linked disorder.278 
In  the  Brave  New  World  report  it  was  suggested  that  challenges 
to this prohibition  on  the basis  of the  'legal  doctrine  of  informed 
consent with respect to medical treatment' may not be successful as 
'[t]he state could likely establish that such a prohibition or regulation 
is rationally  connected  to  a legitimate  government  purpose' .279   As 
well, the report suggested that while in Canada information related to 
genetic disease in an in vitro embryo may be 'categorised as central 
to a person's decision regarding reproduction', knowledge related to 
the sex of the embryo may be seen as more of a 'lifestyle choice' .280 
In Australia, the NHMRC Guidelines prohibit  'selection of the sex 
of an embryo except to reduce the risk of transmission of a serious 
genetic condition' pending further discussions.281 The Victoria ITA's 
policy lists 'the use  of  sex-selection  except  to  reduce  the  risk  that 
the child will  be  affected  by  a  genetic  abnormality  or  a  disease' 282 
as prohibited under the IT Act.283 The Western Australian RTC also 
states the 'use of an embryo diagnostic procedure  for  sex  selection 
alone  is not  permitted' .284 
The UK's HFE Act  does  not  expressly  prohibit  sex  selection 
for non-medical reasons,  however,  the  HFEA's  restriction  of  PGD 
to 'serious genetic conditions' has, in the past, effectively  ruled  this 
 
out.285 Recently, the STC Committee's Report reveals that there is 
pressure to open up the use  of  PGD  for  social  sex  selection. While 
the report notes objections based on demographic, international and 
psychosocial implications, as well as ethical considerations and sex 
discrimination, they conclude that '[t]he onus should be on those who 
oppose sex selection for social reasons using PGD to show harm from 
its use ...On balance we find no adequate justification for prohibiting 
the use of sex selection  for  family  balancing' .286  The  report  states 
that evidence of 'harms to individuals of society' does not counter 
balance a restriction on 'reproductive freedom' in the case of sex- 
selection  for  family  balancing. 287  In  contrast  the  Ethics  Committee 
of the Royal College of Obstetricians and Gynaecologists (RCOG) 
suggested that 'the evidential burden' should be 'the responsibility of 
those advocating the introduction of PGD to show that it does not lead 
to unfair discrimination' .288 In their response to the STC's report,  the 
UK Government declined to adopt the Committee's recommendation 
stating that '[t]he Government has no plans to alter  this  position  to 
allow sex selection other than for compelling medical reasons' .289 
Indeed, the HFE Bill would continue to prohibit non-medical sex- 
selection, and amendments to  the  embryo  testing  provisions  could 
not  authorise  such a practice. 290 
While the STC's position is consistent with  their  own definition 
of the 'precautionary principle' - 'that alleged harms to society or to 
patients need to be demonstrated before forward progress is unduly 
impeded',291 the Government's response to the STC contests '...the 
 
Committee's  interpretation  of  the  precautionary  principle',  arguing 
that '[t]he potential harms  that  should  be  taken  into  account  may 
not necessarily be susceptible to demonstration and  evidence  in 
advance' .292 The weight given  to public  concerns  and critiques  about 
the use of PGD for non-medical/social sex selection293 may offer 
valuable lessons for those seeking to critique genetic diagnosis in 
relation to disability. Fears about eugenics and 'designer babies' are 
characterised in many  of the documents we examined as irrational or 
emotive: 
If ensuring that your  child  is less  likely  to face  a  debilitating  disease 
in the course of their life can be termed eugenics, we have no problem 
with its use. State programs that impose a genetic blueprint are another 
matter. They should be outlawed as part of any  regulation of assisted 
reproduction . Use of the word eugenics must not be used as an emotive 
term  of  abuse to obscure  rational  debate.294 
 
The HGRP states that, '[i]t may be the case that most fears of 
eugenics are unfounded, based as they are on unrealistic expectations 
of what can be achieved through genetic technology' .295 And the 
Human Genetics Commission in the UK cites 'practical limitations' 
to show that '[t]he anxiety that PGD lies at the top of a slippery slope 
leading to the possibility of a wide range of potential enhancements, 
such as intelligence or beauty is misplaced' .296 
However, disability rights critiques make it clear that selection 
on the basis of genetic markers or conditions is not necessarily any 
less 'social' than selection for athletic ability or hair colour.297 Socially 
 
constructed norms about intelligence and beauty are as much a part 
of our acceptance of selection out of genetic conditions as are those 
rooted in medical realities. As the RCOG points out in their position 
on sex selection: 'If sex is allowed as a sole criterion, then selection 
for other characteristics (e.g. intelligence, beauty, sporting prowes s 
etc) would be permissible should the techniques for doing so become 
available'. 298 Their position acknowledges the inconsistency between 
the position that 'it is ethical to use PGD to discriminate against one 
sort of condition (disability)' but not 'against another condition (i.e. 
sex)' .299 This inconsistency clearly demonstrate s the need to examine 
assumptions about the inherent objectivity of 'medical' selection, 
particularly as the uses of PGD extend beyond concerns about the 
embryo   itself . 
 
 
4. The HLA Tissue-Typed Embryo 
 
Through PGD, human leukocyte antigen (HLA) tissue typing 
strategies can characterise the post-PGD embryo according to whether 
the tissue-type of the child the embryo might become, will be an 
appropriate match for stem cell donation to a  living  sick  sibling.300 
HLA tissue typing or preimplantation  tissue  typing  (PTT)301  uses 
PGD for 'third party benefit' 302  by  allowing  the  woman  undergoing 
IVF and her family to 'ensure that their next child will have identical 
HLA proteins '303 so that its stem cells can be 'transplanted into the 
 
affected  sibling' .304 
The use of HLA tissue typing has been confined to siblings in all 
jurisdictions  that  have  produced  relevant  regulations  or guidelines.305 
In Canada where no guidelines or regulations yet exist,  the  recent 
policy document on PGD refers to the 'existing child',  the  'affected 
child' and the 'saviour sibling phenomenon' ,306 and the  Brave  New 
World report refers to 'a seriously ill sibling' .307 The  HFEA's  2004 
policy on tissue typing, which expanded the application of tissue 
typing, did not conclusively rule out its use for a genetic  parent's 
benefit, suggesting it needed 'further consideration' .308 The policy 
approved tissue typing 'subject to appropriate safeguards', where 'a 
genuine need for potentially life-saving tissue' exists for an 'affected 
child' .309 The 2005 review of the HFE Act in the UK rejected this 
position and concluded that, 'there are no compelling reasons for a 
statutory authority to make judgements on  whether  or  not  a family 
can seek  preimplantation  tissue  typing,  provided  they  fall  within 
the parameters set  out  by  Parliament',  and  explicitly  contemplates 
the  possibility  of  'saviour  sons  and  daughters,  or  even  nephews 
and nieces' .310 However, the HFE Bill currently under consideration 
would  amend  the HFE Act to limit PTT to  a  sibling  suffering from 
a  'serious  medical  condition' .311 
In the case of PTT, embryos found to be a 'match'  for  a  sick 
sibling would be deemed suitable for transfer to the woman . Embryos 
found not to  be  a  match  would  therefore  be  deemed  'unsuitable' 
for implantation to the woman undergoing IVF. As the notion of 'third-
 
party benefit' 312 makes clear, suitability in this case would be determined 
not by the well-being of a potential  future  child, but  by their potential  
to produce  stem cells to treat  an existing  sibling  with a disease or 
condition.  Canada's  Brave  New  World  Report  describes the benefit of 
tissue typing as 'making it possible to select for and transfer only those 
in  vitro  embryos  that  have  certain  traits  needed' for donation to the 
living sibling.313  The report uses the term 'donor child' to  characterise  
the  future  child  produced  through  this  process of  selection.314 
This description challenges the often-invoked 'seriousness' 
justifications for the use of PGD and this inconsistency is dealt with 
differently in the jurisdictions we examined . In New Zealand the 
embryo to be tested must itself be at risk for an inherited genetic 
condition for which PGD is already  applied,  thus  making  PGD  for 
PTT an 'add-on' procedure. 315  In  contrast  PGD  can  be  applied  with 
'the sole treatment objective' for the  purpose  of  finding  a  tissue 
match in the UK. 316  The HFEA tissue typing policy has moved from 
a 'restrictive' application of PGD for the purpose of finding a tissue 
match only where the use  of  PGD  was justified  by  the  embryo  'at 
risk from  the  condition  by  which  the  existing  child  is  affected' ,317 
to a new 'extended' policy in which there is no distinction  made 
between  'inherited  and  sporadic  diseases' .318 
Two cases from the UK illustrate the  complexity  of  regulating 
PGD for PTT.319 The situation of the Hashmi family became the basis 
for R (on the application of Quintavalle) v. Human Fertilisation and 
Embryology Authority 320 a case which sought judicial review of the 
 
HFEA's approval of a licence for PTT.321 The Hashmi's fell under the 
accepted applications of the  tissue  typing  2001  UK  policy  however, 
the case was based on a third-party challenge to the authority of the 
HFEA to licence for the use of PGD for the purposes of PTT.322 Zain 
Hashmi, the fourth child in a family of five, had a blood  condition 
called beta thalassaernia  major which could be cured with a stem cell 
transplant from someone with matching tissue, likely a sibling. None 
of the existing children were a match; and while Mrs. Hashmi got 
pregnant twice in hopes of producing a match she chose to terminate 
one pregnancy after the prenatal testing showed the child would have 
the same blood condition, and the next child was not a tissue match 
for Zain.  The  Hashrnis,  through  a  physician,  applied  to  the  HFEA 
to undergo IVF treatment and use PGD to find a tissue match. The 
license was granted, however one attempt produced only one  tissue 
match  which  was  also  'affected'  by  the  same  condition,  and  while 
a second produced two 'unaffected' tissue matches, neither of these 
successfully  implanted  in  Mrs.  Hashmi.323 
The court challenge was appealed to the House of Lords which 
held that PTT was an activity within  the provision of IVF for which 
the HFEA was  authorised to grant a licence, under paragraph 1(1)(d) 
of Schedule 2 of the Act: 'practices designed  to secure that embryos 
are in a suitable condition to be placed in a woman or to determine 
whether embryos are suitable for that purpose' .324 By interpreting 
'suitable' in a purposive manner, the court granted the HFEA broad 
powers  to  judge  what   was   ethically   acceptable,   which   included 
 
an acceptance of 'the purposes of the mother' as included under 
'suitability'.325 This logically opens the door to the HFEA  authorising 
the use of PGD for  social  selection,  however  the  court  determined 
that it would be the responsibility of  Parliament  to  step  in  if  this 
were to occur.326 
Charlie Whitaker was born with Diamond Blackfan syndrome, 
which is a rare  form of anaemia that can be cured by stem cells 
from a tissue match. Neither of his parents are carriers, and his sister 
was not a tissue match. The family went to an ART centre, which 
applied for a licence to the HFEA to perform PGD for the purposes 
of finding a tissue match for Charlie. In this case the HFEA rejected 
the application under the 2001 policy because  the condition of the 
existing child was not an inherited condition; therefore, it is highly 
unlikely that the embryos the Whitakers would produce through IVF 
would be 'affected', and directly  'benefit' 327  from undergoing PGD. 
The Whitakers chose to travel to  the  US  to  undergo  the  procedure 
and a successful tissue  match  was  produced. 328  While  the  story  of 
the Whitaker  family  provides  important  context  for  understanding 
the UK's shift to a more expansive policy, the House of Lords' 
conclusions in Quintavalle help to explain the recent  push  to  have 
more legally  defined parameters  about the use of PGD in the UK. 
In her submissions to the SCT, the Chair of the HFEA suggested 
that 'she would like to see permitted purposes of PGD set out in 
legislation in a similar way to research' ,329 to avoid the dilemmas 
involved in dealing with PGD. Clearly the HFEA's reliance on 'a 
 
significant  risk  of  a   serious   genetic   condition   being   present   in 
the embryo' 330 as the basis for limiting the application of PGD is 
complicated by both  the  broad  authority  they  were  found  to  have 
by  the   House   of   Lords   and   the   court's   purposive   interpretation 
of  suitability.  The   SCT   did   recommend   reducing   the   'freedom' 
of the HFEA granted by  the  current  HFE  Act  in  order  to  ensure 
that 'Parliament is able to revisit contentious issues relating to the 
creation of new life and the permissible uses  of  human  embryos' .331 
The Government's response to the review agreed 'that it would be 
preferable if the parameters for PGD were more clearly set out  in 
law' .332 The HFE Bill would provide explicit parameters, codifying 
acceptable purposes for the HFEA's approval of licenses for embryo 
testing,  including  PTI.333 
The New Zealand policy  on  HLA  tissue  typing  restricts  PGD 
for PTT to situations  where there are 'therapeutic indications for the 
embryo to justify embryo biopsy' .334 It permits  tissue  typing  where 
both the 'affected  child' and the embryo are at risk of being  affected 
by a 'familial single gene disorder or  a familial  sex-linked  disorder' 
and restricts the 'planned treatment' to the  use  of  'only  the  cord 
blood of the future sibling' .335 The HGRP has pointed out that the 
potentially unintended consequence of  New  Zealand's  approach  is 
that even where PGD would be  'clinically  indicated' for the embryo, 
if the sibling is not suffering from a 'genetic' condition, but requires 
stem cell transplantation for another condition, PGD would not be 
authorised. Further, if the sibling did have a genetic disorder but the 
 
embryo was not at risk of inheriting that particular  condition,  PGD 
could still be performed 336  as long  as the  embryo  could  be  affected 
by a 'familial single  gene  disorder  or  a familial  sex-linked  disorder 
for which a PGD test is available' .337 In this  case  the  HLA  tissue 
typing is seen as an 'add on' justified by 'medical indication'  for 
embryo  biopsy. 338 
The concept of restricting PGD for PTT so that the 'embryo may 
benefit'  (as described  in the Whitaker case) or to  situations where 
a 'therapeutic indication' for the embryo exists,339 or to which the 
embryo may receive a 'clinical benefit' 340  raises a series of problems. 
First, it presupposes that an embryo can have a 'therapeutic indication' 
to, or 'clinical benefit' from its being  biopsied, or from a therapeutic 
intervention that could occur  to  the  embryo  based  on  the  results  of 
the biopsy (or even to the fetus through, for example, fetal surgery). 
Embryo therapy currently does not exist, although it may in the future, 
as fetal surgery is now being  performed for anomalies such as those 
related to the  cardiovascular 341  and  neuro/skeletal  systems.342  Rather, 
the 'therapeutic indication' or 'clinical benefit' that is implied in cases 
where PGD has been approved for the embryos at risk of having a 
genetic condition is the destruction of  the  embryo:  the  antithesis  of 
both a 'therapeutic indication'  and a  'clinical  benefit'.  In  our opinion 
the therapeutic indication is for the  child  that  is  already  born  and 
who will die without  stem cell transplantation.  It is for this child that 
a woman is willing to go  through the risks of IVF medication and 
surgery. We believe that it is compassionate as well  as  logical  'to 
 
justify embryo biopsy' on the basis  of  its  'benefit'  to  a child  rather 
than  to the destruction  of  an embryo. 
One of the most common concerns raised in relation to tissue 
typing is that 'children are being  'designed' to meet the needs of an 
existing person' .343 'Objectification' or 'commodification' arguments344 
pointed out in some commentaries 345 can be problematised by 
arguments about the diversity and complexity of motivations behind 
the choice to have children in all situations.346 As the STC in the UK 
pointed out, some people may object to PGD for PTT 'in principle', 
but others differentiate where 'the child born as a result of the test 
was at risk of developing the condition' .347 Such differentiations rest 
on the notion that the embryo should  'benefit from the process' 348 
to balance  out concerns about the  'safety of the biopsy  process' 349 
and the dilemma of children being born 'solely as a means  to an 
end' .350 
In their most recent policy the HFEA revisited the  issue  of 
safety  and 
 
took the view that the risk to the resulting child associated with embryo 
biopsy is not enough to warrant a policy which distinguishes between 
cases in which preimplantation tissue typing  is  used  in  combination 
with PGD for serious  disease  and  where  discovering  tissue  type  is 
the sole treatment objective. However, the latest evidence should be 
considered  in relation  to each  application. 351 
 
 
Health Canada's issues paper on PGD cites undue exposure of 
an embryo to the 'potential health risks of PGD' as a concern where 
'there is no risk to inherit a genetic condition' .352 The paper points 
out that 'whatever the potential benefits of PGD-HLA, they must also 
counterbalance the fact that in vitro embryos that would otherwise be 
fit for transfer may not be used for reproductive purposes'. 353 
Another  related  set of concerns has emerged  about the  'welfare' 
of a child born as a 'saviour sibling', particularly in relation to the 
impact on family relationships 354  and 'psychological' effects.355 The 
submissions of the British Medical Association to the STC Review 
cited concerns about  'psychological harm' 356 and the Royal College 
of Obstetricians and Gynaecologists noted that '[t]his area is too new 
for the full effects to be known on the child conceived' .357 The HFEA 
policy notes that there are also concerns as to the 'welfare of the 
mother undergoing IVF at an already stressful time' .358 However, while 
the HFEA cautioned that 'these issues be carefully and sensitively 
addressed ',359 they concluded that there was 'no evidence ...that 
adverse psychological effects would result from  the  procedure' .360 
The STC's response to the concerns about tissue typing, in line with 
their general preference for minimal regulatory intervention discussed 
above, characterises these issues as 'matters for doctors to explain 
clearly in advance and not for regulation or legislation' .361 The ITA 
in Victoria leaves the decision of the application of PGD for PTT 
to 'Ethics Committee at the institution where the procedure is being 
undertaken' on a 'case by case basis' ,362 however they do direct them 
 
to consider impacts on the future child such as the potential failure 
of treatment for the living sibling.363 
 
 
5. The Post-PGD Carrier Embryo 
 
Beyond  identifying  embryos  that   are  themselves   'affected' 
by a genetic condition, PGD can also identify embryos which are 
'carriers'364 of genes for autosomal 'recessive disorders' .365 The person 
into which a carrier embryo may develop does not develop the genetic 
'condition', as it possesses only one of the two genes366 required to 
express the phenotype (characteristics) of the condition . Although the 
person the embryo can become will not exhibit the condition, if this 
person becomes a biological parent with a person who  'carries' a 
gene for the same 'recessive' condition, their child has a 25% chance 
of expressing this condition and a 50% chance of being a carrier, 
based on Mendelian genetics.367 The post-PGD embryo, thus could 
become a person who could pass on the condition to their children,368 
but who is unaffected by the gene themselves. 
The status of the carrier embryo  is unclear in most jurisdictions 
as there is considerable controversy about the ethics of not implanting 
such 'healthy' embryos where the reason to not implant them is based 
on the very small possibility that, if the embryo becomes an adult who 
has a child with  another  individual  who  carries  the  recessive  gene, 
the child could have the condition.369 In support of not  implanting 
 
carrier  embryos,  it  has  been  suggested  that  women   'may  wish  to 
ensure that their future children will not have to experience the same 
difficulties' 370 in making reproductive  choices about genetic disorders, 
and should therefore be able to 'choose not to replace carrier embryos 
as part of their treatment' .371  In  the  UK,  such  a decision  'rests  with 
the patient  in consultation  with  the clinical  team' .372 
In the  case of a carrier embryo, 'health' or 'suitability' for 
reproductive use is defined  in  relation  to  the  potential  children  of 
the potential future person that would result from an embryo's 
implantation in the woman. In Australia, this kind of multigenerational 
selection against genetic conditions  appears  to  be  incompatible  with 
the national guidelines on PGD.373 Although there is no national 
regulation in Australia specifically addressing the post-PGD carrier 
embryo, the NHMRC's guidelines specifically state that '[p]ending 
further community discussion ... PGD must not be used for prevention 
of conditions that do not seriously harm the person to be born' .374 
Therefore in  the  case  of  an  embryo  carrying  a  gene  that  does  not 
in itself express a 'serious' condition, as is the case for autosomal 
recessive genes,  the  NHMRC  guidelines  indicate  that  post-PGD 
carrier embryos should  be  implanted.375  Victoria's  ITA  guidelines 
specify that testing and selection for carrier status would be approved 
on a case-by-case basis;376 however, interestingly the guidelines 
differentiate between  carriers for sex-linked disorders for which  there 
is no approval from the Authority required, and carriers of autosomal 
recessive disorder where 'the future child's risk of transmitting  a 
 
genetic abnormality is much lower than with x-linked conditions' for 
which  approval  of the Authority  is required. 377 
The decision to transfer carrier embryos to the woman will likely 
be affected by the number of embryos that are deemed 'suitable for 
transfer' through PGD.378 In the UK, the HGC's  response  to  the 
HFEA consultation  on  PGD  in  2000  suggested  ' ...if  it was  possible 
to exclude affected  embryos  without  discovering  the  carrier  status 
of  others  without  compromising  the   accuracy   of   the   test,   then 
this  is  to  be  preferred' .379  They  cited  both  the  'increased   chance 
of an unaffected pregnancy' and protection of 'the unborn child's 
subsequent right to decide for themselves whether or not to be tested 
for their carrier status' 380 as the basis for this  recommendation.  The 
latter is consistent with the overall respect for individual reproductive 
autonomy in the UK, however autonomy could also be the basis for 
arguments that '...people should generally be given a choice to use 
artificial reproductive technologies  as they feel appropriate  as long as 
it does not  harm  that  child' .381 
Another justification for selecting against carriers  is  the 
'obligation . . .to have the best possible child' both in terms of that 
individual  child's  'health'  and  the  concern  'that  the  child   should 
not  burden  future  generations  in  terms  of  health  and  social  care' .382 
The subjective assessment of what is to be considered 'best',  what 
'health' means, and what should be  considered  a  'burden'  on  society 
are avoided by a reliance on assumptions of health  and normalcy  as 
the absence of disability and/or a genetic condition  which,  in  our 
 
view, should not be the case.383 This kind of argument ultimately 
undermines justifications  for the  use  of  PGD based  on  its limitation 
to  'serious'  conditions,  and  'objective'  criteria.384 
Interestingly, the HGC reversed its cautious position on carrier 
embryos in the 2006 Making Babies report. They state that '...in 
situations where PGD is being used, and where there are both carrier 
and unaffected embryos of equal quality, parents should be able to 
request which they prefer to  be implanted' .385 Their report cites the 
position of the British Medical Association .386 While noting concerns 
about the unreasonableness of rejecting an embryo 'predicted to be 
healthy', they accept that '[i]n practice ...there may be a hierarchy of 
preference in which unaffected embryos that look healthy are scored 
higher than embryos that are carriers or look less likely to implant 
successfully' .387 As the pregnancy rate following  PGD  is  already 
lower than the thirteen percent pregnancy rate generally accepted for 
IVF,388 it would be clinically  appropriate to cryopreserve (and transfer 
to the woman at  a  later  time)  post-PGD  carrier  embryos,  if  there 
are more embryos than the one or two that can be safely implanted 
following  an  IVF  treatment  cycle,389   in  order  that  the  woman  need 
not  risk  harms  of  additional  IVF cycles.39° Carrier  embryos  may  be 
seen currently as occupying an uncertain position between 'suitable' 
and 'unsuitable' depending on the supply of in vitro embryos for 
research. This uncertain position excludes 'healthy' embryos with 
particular genetic characteristics that have no consequences for the 
potential child itself from reproductive use. 
 
The HGRP  report  states  that  while,  '[t]esting  for  carrier  status' 
is not covered by the current guidelines in New Zealand,391 'some 
families are using PGD to select against carrier embryos'.392 In the 
absence of regulatory direction, selection against  carrier  embryos 
appears to be increasingly accepted in New Zealand without public 
debate  or  discussion. 
Canada's AHR Act does not specify what the status of carrier 
embryos identified by PGD would be. Although it was not clear in 
any of the Canadian documents examined, arguably it is likely that 
carrier embryos deemed unsuitable for transfer on the basis of genetic 
characteristics would be characterised the same way as an 'affected' 
embryo, and would therefore be subject to the applicable consent and 
donation process for use in research or training. 
In the appendix to Australia's NHMRC  2004 Guidelines,  which 
are currently under  review,  one  of  the  listed  'reasons  for  opposing 
or limiting the use of genetic  technologies  associated  with  ART'  is 
that '[o]therwise normal (so-called 'carrier') embryos that would be 
expected to have a normal life will be discarded' .393 In addition,  our 
study suggests that selection against carrier embryos is problematic 
because of the potential for genetic carriers to be deemed incompatible 
with reproductive use, once again raising questions noted above about 
how this may change social and medical attitudes and practices, and 
what kind of implications this would have for people living with 






Our analysis suggests a mutually constructive relationship 
between characterisations of the post-PGD embryo and the expanding 
purposes for which PGD is applied, as well as the uses  to which 
embryos are ultimately relegated. The language of characterisation 
exposed above, through  which  post-PGD  embryos  are  deemed  to 
be 'unaffected' or 'affected', to be 'carriers', or are selected  on the 
basis of sex or an HLA tissue match, all raise important social and 
ethical questions that must be examined as the regulation of ART 
develops internationally. Driven by imperatives such as reproductive 
autonomy, the desire for children of particular characteristics, 'disease' 
prevention, and sources of embryos, particularly 'fresh' embryos, for 
research purposes, clinicians, patients, researchers and policy makers 
are circumventing debates about the social dimensions of using PGD 
for a growing number of genetic indications. The consequences of 
this lack of social concern could be profound for people living with 
genetic conditions, other disabilities, their families and broader society. 
Subtle shifts in language and terminology about what it means for 
an embryo to be 'healthy', or compatible with reproductive use, can 
have long-term consequences on broad social norms and values; and, 
as discussed above, far from being neutral, such determinations point 
to the ongoing medicalisation of disability and women's reproductive 
choices. Assumptions about the meaning of health, normalcy and 
 
reproductive choice must be exposed  and examined to ensure that 
new technologies and practices benefit all members of society, and 
that reproductive health policy is developed with a broad spectrum of 
perspectives and experiences in mind. 
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